Florida Law Review
Volume 22

Issue 3

Article 3

January 1970

Death With Dignity: A Recommendation for Statutory Change
Howard W. Brill

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Howard W. Brill, Death With Dignity: A Recommendation for Statutory Change, 22 Fla. L. Rev. 368 (1970).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Brill: Death With Dignity: A Recommendation for Statutory Change

NOTES
DEATH WITH DIGNITY: A RECOMMENDATION FOR
STATUTORY CHANGE*
For thou shalt sleep and never wake again
And quitting life, shall quit thy living pain.
-Dryden**
Do not go gentle into that good night
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
-Dylan Thomas***

In the 1969 session of the Florida legislature, a state representative introduced a bill to deal with the problem of the hopeless patient. This bill
would have amended the Florida constitution by incorporating into section
1
2 of the Declaration of Rights the right "to be permitted to die with dignity."
2
Following the failure of the bill to be reported out of committee, the
legislator recast the proposal as a statute 3 and prefiled it in the House of
Representatives. 4 The proposal now provides that any person may execute,
with the formalities required for execution of a will,5 a document stating
that he has exercised the right to die with dignity and directing that his
life not be prolonged "beyond the point of a meaningful existence." Upon
a determination by the attending physician that the patient's condition was
hopeless and that he was beyond recovery, the patient's directive would be
carried out by terminating all medication and any artificial means of sustaining life. If the patient were physically or mentally incapable of making
such a decision, then the spouse or, in the case of an unmarried or widowed
individual, a majority of those persons of first degree kinship would be
permitted to request the cessation of treatment when it was unnaturally prolonging an unmeaningful existence. Finally, in the case of a patient incapable
*EDITOR's NOTE: This note received tile Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the summer 1969 quarter.
**Lucretius' Speech Against the Fear of Death, THE POETICAL "VORKS OF JOHN DRYDEN
185 (Cambridge ed. 1909).
***Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, COLLEcTED POEMS OF D'LAN THOMAS

(1953).
1. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 91 (1969).
2. St. Petersburg Times, July 3, 1969, §B at 2, col. 2.
3. The legislator changed the proposal to a statute because he believed it would have
a better chance of passage. Letter from Rep. Walter W. Sackett, Jr. to Howard IV. Brill,
Oct. 17, 1969.
4. Fla. H.R. 3184 (1969), prefiled Oct. 10, 1969. The statute concerns the question of
who may make the decision regarding death with dignity and the manner in which it
may be made. For details regarding the cessation of treatment, see St. Petersburg Times,
Jan. 9, 1969, §B at 1, col. 1; id. Feb. 24, 1969, §B at 1, col. I.
5. FLA. STAT. §731.07 (1967).
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of making a decision 6 and without relatives, three doctors would be permitted
to make the request to a circuit judge. In each case, before any treatment was
terminated, the doctors would have the responsibility of determining from
a medical standpoint, whether all meaningful life had passed. With the
exception of the last situation, this determination could only occur if the
patient or his next of kin had affirmatively indicated a desire for the cessa7
tion of treatment.
This note will examine several aspects of the death with dignity proposal: present law in the area and the effect of the proposed statute upon
it; possibilities of achieving the same result under current law; societal attitudes toward such a proposal; and moral and individual choices regarding
the nature of death.
THE CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMANITARIAN DEATH

The law does not accept humanitarian motives as a defense to homicide.
If a person dies a moment earlier because of the action of a second person,
homicide has occurred.8 People v. Kirby9 dealt with a father who had drowned
his children because he thought it would be better for them "to go into
eternity than to stop in this world."'1 In spite of his belief that he was doing
what was best for them, he was convicted of murder. Also, the fact that the
individual killed would soon die anyway is not a defense against a charge
of criminal homicide. In Commonwealth v. Bowen," the defendant was accused of urging a fellow convict to kill himself prior to his scheduled execution in order to deny the state its spectacle. The judge instructed the jury
that if the defendant had intentionally accelerated the deceased's death, he
was liable for murder. 2 Neither invitation nor consent is a valid defense

6. For a discussion of the situation arising when the patient has asked the doctor to
use all available treatment, see text accompanying notes 48-52 infra.
7. This proposal is distinguished from various euthanasia bills in that euthanasia requires a positive act to end life while the present proposal merely calls for the cessation
of treatment. Second, voluntary euthanasia requires the patient to consciously request the
fatal treatment, as contrasted with the situation where the patient is unable to consent and
the relatives must decide. Third, the euthanasia proposals have often been accused of
allowing one to request death merely if the patient is in great pain or is suffering from
an incapacitation that forces him to be totally dependent on others. The death with
dignity proposal is limited to those beyond any hope of recovery. G. WLLIAMS, THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 293-302 (1958).
8. B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 370 (1959). See also G.

WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 289.
9. 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 28 (N.Y. 1823). See Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1007 (1923). See also
Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947), where the petitioner, who was
seeking to reverse a denial of citizenship, had used chloroform to kill his thirteen-year old
son-whom the court described as a "monster." Since petitioner had been convicted of
second degree manslaughter, Judge Learned Hand concluded that he was lacking the
"good moral character" required for citizenship.
10. People v. Kirby, 2 Park. Grim. Rep. 28, 29 (N.Y. 1823).
11. 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
12. Id. at 360.
7-
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against a charge of homicide. 13 Finally, necessity, even in extreme circumstances where the defendant had to choose between killing a nonassailant
4
and dying himself, has not been recognized by the courts.1
Although it is well established that a physician is not insulated from
criminal sanctions if he causes a patient's death, 15 various medical situations
in which a doctor may intentionally shorten the life of an incurably ill patient
to allow death with dignity demand a reevaluation of the scope of this
rule. The questionable merit of the blanket application of the concept that
holds physicians liable in all circumstances is illustrated by State v. Sander.'6
There the defendant physician admitted injecting forty cubic centimeters of
air into the bloodstream of a suffering, hopelessly ill cancer patient whose
death resulted less than ten minutes after the injection. Commission of
euthanasia by the deliberate administration of some toxic substance to the
patient renders the physician liable for first degree murder regardless of
the doctor's humanitarian motives, the wishes of the decedent's relatives, or
even the patient's consent.
Even where the doctor, recognizing a patient's suffering, makes poison or
extra sleeping pills accessible to the patient who then administers the fatal
dose himself, the well-intentioned physician may find himself guilty of
murder. In People v. Roberts4 the defendant was found guilty of first de-

gree murder because he had prepared poison and placed it near his wife,
who was incurably ill and helpless with multiple sclerosis. The court gave no
legal significance to the fact that he had made the poison available to his
wife solely for the purpose of ending her suffering.
In contrast with those cases where the doctor's act is calculated to cause
death are those where the drugs administered precipitate death as a side
effect. For example, a doctor may give a patient a dose of morphine to ease
his suffering. The efficacy of this drug will probably decline with continued
use, and it may be necessary to increase the dosage to maintain the same painkilling effect. Although the doctor knows that the morphine will eventually
weaken the patient and thereby hasten death, administering the drug does
reduce the pain and make the doomed patient's last moments more tolerable.' 8
According to strict legal interpretation, the doctor has knowingly "caused"
the patient's death by hastening it. However, the primary purpose was to
control the pain, and this was done in a legally and medically acceptable
manner. Just as in each operation there is a balancing of risks, here the doctor must weigh the patient's increased comfort against the increased possi13. Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 37 S.E.2d 43 (1946).
14. The Queen v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 624 (1884)
(starving seamen in an open boat killed and consumed one of their own).
15. B. SHARTEL 9: M. PLANT, supra note 8, at 370.
16. Unreported 1950 New Hampshire decision, cited in N. Y. Times, March 10, 1950,
§1, at 1, col. 6; B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, supra note 8, at 370; Comment, Criminal Law Humanitarian Motive as a Defense to Homicide, 48 MICH. L. REv. 1199 (1950).
17. 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920). See also FLA. STAT. §782.08 (1967). "Every

person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of
manslaughter."
18. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 285-91.
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bility of death. While control of the suffering is the primary effect of the
treatment, the secondary effect may be the hastening of death. 19 Although
there are no cases on this point, it would seem that the doctor would be
cleared of guilt because of the legitimate nature of the choice that he must
make. 20 If, however, the doctor, in order to hasten death, had administered a
dose far larger than needed to reduce the pain, he would be legally responsible.2
Part of the difficulty in this situation arises from a basic contradiction in
the Hippocratic Oath. 22 On entering the medical profession the doctor
pledges to prolong and protect life and also to relieve the suffering of his
patient. With the advance of modem medicine a patient who would have
died in the past may today remain hanging to a thread of life. This places
the doctor in a dilemma: keeping the patient "alive" may increase his
suffering; yet, in using drugs to control the suffering, death may be brought
closer. By choosing the former course, physicians support the criticism that
they view death as an enemy that must be vanquished, and therefore go to
heroic lengths to save all patients, regardless of the physical pain or emotional
22

CoSt.

The previously discussed situations involve a physician committing an act
that causes death; yet, it is also possible for death to occur if the doctor fails
to act. Rather than prolong the existence of a patient in an irreversible
coma, the doctor might stop all treatment and allow the patient to die mercifully and quickly. This would theoretically subject the doctor to criminal
liability.2 4 A statutory adoption of the death with dignity concept would
grant a doctor in this situation legal immunity for ending supportive
therapy if all the requirements of the statute had been met.
Liability for nonfeasance exists only where there is a legal duty to take
positive action.2 5 In Regina v. Instan26 failure to provide food or medical
attention to a helpless aunt rendered her niece liable for the aunt's death.
A duty to care for the aunt had arisen from the fact that the defendant and
the aunt had lived together for some time. Similarly, the law imposes a duty
upon a doctor to care for his patients. However, unlike the underlying
rationale for the Instan duty, which arose from a factual setting,27 the duty
19. Id. at 285-87.
20. Professor Williams prefers to justify the doctor's action by necessity rather than
under some tenuous theory of causation. That is, the doctor necessarily had to administer
the morphine to control the patient's suffering, instead of saying that death was actually
caused by the original disease. Id. at 286-90.

21. Id. at 290.
22. J. FETcmm, MORALS
23.

AND MFDICINE 172 (1954).
See generally B. GI.AzER & M. STRAuss, AWARENESS OF DYING 190-201 (1965).

24. A leading medical law scholar doubts that any criminal action would be concluded or even initiated based on mere inaction. B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, supra note 8, at
371.
25. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 592-93 (1969). The author distinguishes a forbearance
or an intentional negative act from an unintentional omission.
26. 1 Q.B. 450, 17 Cox Crim. Cas. 602 (1893).
27. The exception to the rule of no liability for nonfeasance is that when a doctor
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imposed upon a physician arises from a consenual relationship in which
the patient seeks the assistance of the doctor, who agrees to aid him. 28 Having
accepted the patient on a contractual basis, the physician must treat him
until a cure is effected, the patient dies, or the doctor is dismissed from the
case. 29 Although the doctor is given considerable latitude in the treatment he
may prescribe, he is somewhat limited by the need for the patient's consent
and prevailing medical opinion. 30 If the physician arbitrarily withdraws from
the case without allowing reasonable time for the patient to obtain a substitute physician, he may be liable for any resulting injury31 In Blackburn's
Administrator v. Curd32 the defendant doctor had surgically removed a
growth from the decedent's head. In spite of the requests of the relatives, the
doctor refused to attend or treat his patient for three days following the
operation. The doctor was held both civilly and criminally liable for the
resulting death.
Related problems may occur where life-supporting systems or drugs have
not yet been employed. If, for example, the drugs normally used to treat
pneumonia have no effect, the doctor may still decide not to employ a somewhat experimental drug since the patient is in the terminal stages of leukemia. By not using this therapeutic measure, which has the prospect of prolonging life, the patient's death is hastened. From the physician's standpoint
a decision not to use all available therapy is far easier to make than one
that requires the withdrawal of a life-supporting system presently in use.33
Assuming once again that both the patient and relatives prefer a gentle,
merciful death, may the doctor be held criminally liable?
This final situation, where the doctor has not used all available means
of treating a patient, appears to be a form of abandonment. Just as Dr. Curd
was liable for refusing to treat Blackburn, so a doctor who fails to use all
available drugs to treat pneumonia in a leukemia patient might be liable.
The main difference in the two cases is one that the law refuses to recognizethe condition of the patient. In the Curd case the decedent was an ablebodied man who could expect complete recovery, while the hypothetical
patient will die of leukemia in spite of all medical attention. Although the
law declares that hastening the death of another is grounds for criminal
liability, nonetheless the jury, in its role as the conscience of the community,
has distinguished cases according to the condition of the patient.
or anyone else acts as a Good Samaritan he assumes a legal duty to carry on with his
assistance until the danger point is past or until he is released. R. PERKINS, supra note 25, at

597.
28. Comment, The Action of Abandonment in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 TUL.
L. REV. 834 (1962).
29. Id. at 835.
30. B. SHARTEL g M. PLANT, supra note 8, at 8.
31. Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney
Transplantation,15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 357, 382 (1968).
32. 106 S.W. 1186 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908); accord, Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188
So. 815 (1939). See also Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958); Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42
WASH. L. REV. 999, 1005 (1967).
33. Elkinton, The Dying Patient, the Doctor and the Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 740, 743

(1968).
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In similar situations the punishment actually decreed has been far less
than the legal maximum. Only once has a doctor been indicted in an
American jurisdiction for killing a patient; and, in spite of rather dear
evidence in that case, the jury acquitted the doctor when a causal relationship
between his act and the death could not be proved.3 4 After an exhaustive
search, Professor Kamisar has concluded that there has never been a single
indictment for mercy killing by omission. 35 Nonetheless, Kamisar suspects
that medical personnel may allow some persons, particularly newborn defective infants, to die rather than attempting to prolong their existence.38
In those cases involving a relative, an indictment frequently is not even
sought,3 7 perhaps because the elected prosecutor perceives a community sanction for some form of mercy killing. Moreover, when such cases are brought
to trial the jury commonly convicts the defendant of a lesser crime.3 8 Although the jury system is not consistent in exculpating accused mercy
killers,39 verdicts of not guilty are usually based upon failure to prove cau1
sation-0 and upon temporary insanity.4
The difficulties of proving such a charge against a physician and public
opinion against such prosecutions may produce an outcome differing sharply
from the letter of the law in cases involving euthanasia or mercy killing
through nonfeasance. 42 Although none of the cases cited parallel the situations in which the proposed statutory modification would take effect, they do
reveal the necessity for having some definite basis upon which doctors may
rely. In contrast to the broader scope of a euthanasia bill, the death with
34. State v. Sander, unreported 1950 New Hampshire decision, cited in N.Y. Times,
March 10, 1950, §1, at 1, col. 6; Kamisar, Some Non-religious Views Against Proposed "MercyKilling" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 992 (1958). For facts, see text accompanying

note 16 supra.
35. Kamisar, supra note 34, at 983 n.41.
36. See also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 32-33: "[T]he acephalous, ectocardiac, etc.
monster will usually die quickly after birth. This beneficent tendency of nature is assisted,
in Britain at any rate, by the practice of doctors and nurses, who, when. an infant is born
seriously malformed, do not strive officiously to keep it alive, even though they do nothing
positive to kill it. The infant will be left unattended for a number of hours; a normal
child will survive for quite a time without attention, but the-monster usually dies."
37. Comment, supra note 16, at 1200.
38. E.g., Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) (defendant was convicted of second degree manslaughter with a recommendation of "utmost mercy." The
judge sentenced him to five to ten years, and then immediately placed him on probation.)
39. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, unreported 1950 Pennsylvania decision, cited in, N.Y. Times,
April 4, 1950, §1, at 60, col. 4; id. April 8, 1950, §1, at 26, col. 1; id. April 11, 1950, §1,
at 20, col. 5 (defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to three
to six years for the mercy killing of his brother).
40. See, e.g., State v. Sander, unreported 1950 New Hampshire decision, cited in, N. Y.
Times, March 10 1950 §1 at 1 col. 6. For facts see text accompanying notes 16, 34 supra.
41. See, e.g., State v. Paight, unreported 1950 Connecticut decision, cited in, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1950, §1, at 1, col. 2 (a college girl killed her cancer ridden father); State
v. Braunsdorf, unreported 1950 Michigan decision, cited in, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1950, §1,
at 25, col. 4 (defendant had killed his crippled adult daughter).
42. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 292.
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dignity proposal merely provides a framework within which a physician might
legally discontinue treatment of a patient already beyond the point of meaningful life.
THE NEED FOR A STATUTE

One major criticism of the proposed statute is that it makes no change in
the present criminal law. One physician has indicated that "the bill would
be a meaningless addition which could lead to euthanasia."'13 However, the
bill, if enacted, would provide the physician with legal assurance that does
not currently exist. Several alternatives that would reach the same result
without the necessity of a legislative enactment have been suggested.
Several legal scholars challenge the traditional view that an act of
omission or forebearance in withholding life-preserving means may result in
criminal liability for homicide.4 4 Professor Williams, in what is otherwise a
45
lucid plea for voluntary euthansia, merely declares:
[M]ercy killing by omission to use medical means to prolong life is
probably lawful. Although a physician is normally under a duty to use
reasonable care to conserve his patient's life, he is probably exempted
from that duty if life has become a burden to the patient.
In contrast, Professor Fletcher has developed an elaborate and persuasive
argument based upon the distinction between act and omission.46 He concedes that if stopping cardiac resuscitation or removing the needle used in
intravenous therapy is considered an act, "then it is unequivocally forbidden: it is on a par with injecting air into the patient's veins. ' ' 4 7 However,
he contends that if removing the needle is classified as an omission, then the
nature of the relationship between the patient and his physician will determine whether such action is legally forbidden. Rejecting the usual physical
movement test for determining what constitutes an act, Fletcher proposes
instead that the test be: Did the activity cause harm or did it permit harm
to occur? When a doctor turns off a respirator, which is a means of prolonging life, he does not cause death; rather he admits that the patient is
beyond recovery and he permits death to occur. Thus, Fletcher would classify
turning off the respirator or withdrawing the needle as an omission, not an
act.
Fletcher disagrees with Williams' contention that killing by omission is
probably lawful, and accepts the usual view that if a doctor has a duty to a

43.

Orlando Sentinel, Feb. 20, 1969, §D at 6, col. 2.

44.

See R. PERKINs, note 25 supra and accompanying text; Kamisar, supra note 35, at

983.
45. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 291 (emphasis added). Professor Williams cites
neither case law nor statutory authority to support his belief.
46. Fletcher, note 32 supra. The same argument is found in Fletcher, Legal Aspects of
the Decision Not To Prolong Life, 203 J.A.M.A. 65 (1968).
47. Fletcher, supra note 46, at 67.
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patient, he is liable for omitting to perform that duty. 48 Therefore, the question must focus upon: What is the doctor's duty as determined by his relationship with the patient? If the patient requested that the doctor continue treating him, no matter how hopeless he was, and if the doctor accepted these
conditions as part of the employment contract, the doctor's duty would then
be to utilize all available resources to prolong life. If the doctor did
less, such as omitting any treatment or terminating any life-supporting
system, he would be responsible for failing to carry out his duty.49 However,
since patients seldom expressly make any such request,50 what then is the
duty of the doctor whose patient is in the terminal stages? Fletcher feels that
the doctor should treat the patient according to the customary practices of the
time and locale. In other words, if doctors customarily turn off respirators
for doomed patients, and if this particular patient has not demanded anything
more than the customary treatment, the doctor then may turn off the respirator and permit death to occur because the patient did not demand or
expect any higher duty. 51 In accord with this view is the basic rule that a
doctor's discretion in treating patients is restricted by the standards of prevailing medical practice in the community. 52 In sum, if a change occurs in
the services and care that doctors usually perform, then the guidelines for
determining what doctors are legally permitted to do will also change. For
example, in the past it was beyond a doctor's legal and ethical discretion
to use penicillin or an anaesthetic;5 3 today, a doctor would be negligent for
failing to use them when appropriate.
If a Florida court adopted Fletcher's approach, one of the bill's primary
purposes would be accomplished since there would be no requirement to
use extraordinary means to keep alive a person who had not so requested.
Yet, unless this determination were combined with the safeguards of approval by relatives and concurrence by a panel of doctors, the decision could
be made by a single doctor.
Existing constitutional law may provide another method of avoiding the
need for the statutory proposal. Until 1965 the ninth amendment 54 was of
negligible importance in constitutional interpretation. In Griswold v. Connecticut 55 which invalidated a state birth control statute, Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion concluded that the historical purpose of the ninth
amendment was to affirm that there are fundamental rights, in addition to
those in the first eight amendments. Looking to the traditions and the col48.

Id.

49. Id.
50. Although Fletcher does not specifically deal with the question, it seems apparent
that under his interpretation the patient would be able to request in advance that the
doctor turn off the machine and let him die when he was beyond hope, Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv. 999 (1967).
51. Fletcher, Legal Aspects of the Decision Not To Prolong Life, 203 J.A.M.A. 65 (1968).
52. B. SHARTFL & M. PLANT, supra note 8, at 8.
53. Elkinton, supra note 33, at 743.
54. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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lective conscience of the people, he found that the principle of marital privacy
was so rooted in the people as to be fundamental and therefore protected.
Although there is much historical debate, the prevailing view is that the
ninth amendment was added to the Bill of Rights by James Madison to
overcome the objection that the enumeration of certain rights would infer
that no others existed.56
Divergent views exist concerning what rights, if any, are encompassed by
the ninth amendment. One scholar suggests that the rights of privacy, travel,
political participation, access to information, freedom to engage in a business or profession, and treatment for mental illness are included; however,
he also concludes that each of these can be connected in some way to a right
contained in the first eight amendments.- z In upholding a fair housing
statute the Colorado supreme court found the ninth amendment sufficient
authority for the legislature "to define and secure inherent reasonable
expectations in life" by protecting fundamental rights.58 However, such
statutes can easily be connected to the right to acquire and possess property. 9
If the right to die with dignity is to be incorporated into the ninth amendment on a quasi-natural law basis, it appears mandatory that it be connected
to an explicit right within the federal or state constitutions.6
In Skinner v. Oklahoma-1 the Supreme Court reversed an Oklahoma
statute requiring sterilization for habitual criminals, without reaching the
question of cruel and unusual punishment,2 on the ground that it failed to
satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, commented that an individual's fundamental civil
right of procreation is included in due process.63 If man has a right to reproduce, guaranteed by the ninth amendment and the due process clause, perhaps he has a similar natural right to die peacefully when he is on the verge
of death.
In an area of medical law related to the proposed amendment, recent
decisions have affirmed the right of an individual to refuse medical treat-

56.

Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42

VA.

L. REV. 626, 629 (1956).

Contra, Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implications for
Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

40 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1966).
57. Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the
People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121, 135-42 (1967).
58. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 247, 380 P.2d 34,
41 (1962).
59. COLO. CONST. art. II, §3.
60. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §1 contains similar wording: "The enunciation herein
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people."
There are no cases interpreting this section.
61. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
62. The death with dignity proposal cannot be connected to the cruel and unusual
punishment clause, since the purpose of the eighth amendment is to prevent inhuman
or tortuous punishment, not to regulate medical care in a hospital. Black v. United States,
269 F.2d 38, 43 (9th Cir. 1959).

63.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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ment for religious reasons, even if death is assured. The Illinois supreme
court concluded that a lower court order which had authorized blood transfusions for a Jehovah's Witness violated the constitutional right of religious
freedom.64 Since no minor children were involved6 5 and society was not
faced with a clear and present danger,66 no court could compel the individual
to violate the tenets of her religion by accepting this treatment. In effect,
she could will to die for religious reasons.6 7 Since a person may cause his
own death by refusing blood transfusions for religious reasons, the equal
protection clause should logically guarantee the same option to all persons.
In a recent New York case,68 the patient was voluntarily admitted to the
hospital where, for personal, nonreligious reasons, he refused to allow blood
transfusions as part of an operation. In spite of the county hospital's contention that the patient's refusal was the equivalent of suicide and hence
forbidden by the penal law, the court concluded "it is the individual who
is the subject of a medical decision who has the final say .
*.".."69
and, since
he was competent, he was entitled to refuse the transfusions. In a later case,
the same court authorized an emergency operation because the patient was
in a coma and unable either to give or deny permission for the operation.70
Therefore, the New York position is that a person who is mentally competent
may refuse to undergo medically necessary treatment on nonreligious grounds.
No reported Florida cases have dealt with this situation. If the Florida
courts were to adopt the New York position, a patient would clearly have
the right, initially limited to blood transfusions and operations, to make a
competent decision as to the nature of the treatment and thus possibly as to
the manner of his death. This position might naturally be expanded so that
a patient would be enabled, for example, to refuse the assistance of an artificial respirator when he had no hope of recovery. 71 This approach is limited

64. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). See generally Note,
The Right To Die, 18 U. FLA. L. RFv.591 (1966).
65. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 369, 205 N.E.2d 435, 440 (1965). Cf. Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting), where blood transfusions were
authorized in order to save the ilfe of the unborn child of a Jehovah's Witness.
66. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 368, 205 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1965). For examples
of religious activities that do endanger society, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (objection to compulsory vaccination); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(polygamy); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1949) (snake handling).
67. A controversial case reaching a contrary conclusion was Application of the
President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964). Judge J. Skelly Wright ordered blood transfusions to save the
patient's life because the state had an interest in preserving the life of the mother of a sevenmonth old child. Judge Warren Burger strongly dissented, asserting that a hospital has no
duty or moral obligation to preserve life at all costs. Id. at 1016.
68. Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
69. Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
70. Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
71. A thirty-three year old Detroit man, having relied on an artificial kidney for three
years, finally decided to refuse further treatment. "I'm taking myself off the machine,"
he told the doctor. "I'm ready to die." The machine might have prolonged his life for
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because it requires the patient to refuse further treatment before he becomes
incompetent. Since many, if not most, patients never consider this possibility
and reach no understanding with their physician regarding it, they would
have no option but to continue in their vegetable-like existence. In contrast,
the Florida proposal authorizes relatives to initiate proceedings when the
patient ispermanently incompetent.
Whether a patient is beyond hope of recovery is a medical determination;
however, the broader question of when death has occurred cannot be so
easily answered due to the vast gap that exists between the legal and medical
definitions of death. Legal death occurs at the precise moment in time when
respiration and the circulation of the blood permanently cease. 72 In Smith
v. Smith 73 the husband died immediately as the result of an accident, while
the wife suffered permanent brain damage and never regained consciousness.
On probate of the estate the court held that the wife's death occurred when
her heart stopped beating seventeen days after the accident. The most ludicrous extension of this view was Gray v. Sawyer.7 4 Following an accident in
which a woman had been decapitated, her head was found lying ten feet
from her body. She was actively bleeding "from near her neck and blood
was gushing from her body in spurts."' 5 The court held that she was then
alive since the gushing of the blood was evidence that her heart was still
beating.
In contrast, the medical view is that death is an ongoing process, not
something that occurs at a moment in time.76 Various spokesmen for the
profession have proposed that the criterion for death be the cessation of
activity of the central nervous system, that is, "the death of the brain," rather
than the legal criteria of cessation of heartbeat and respiration.77 After
studying comatose individuals who had no discernible activity of the nervous
system, a committee of the Harvard Medical School concluded that there
are four characteristics of a permanently nonfunctioning brain: unresponsitivity and unreceptivity, no spontaneous movements or breathing, no reflexes, and a flat or isoelectric electroencephalogram (EEG)."5 If, according

two months; "I could put up with the blindness and even the pain but the futility-I
mean being inactive and with no chance to do anything-this is the worst of all." He
signed a waiver removing himself from any additional treatment, and then the doctors
used morphine to deaden the pain of his last days. St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 26, 1969,
§A at 1, col. 3. See Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis
and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 357, 381 (1968).
72. Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1950).

73. 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
74. 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
75. Id. at 497.
76. Muller, Legal Medicine and the Delimitation of Death, 14

WORLD MEDICAL J.

140

(1967). Contra, Note, Toward a Judicial Reform of Abortion, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 59, 64
(1969).

77.

Muller, note 76 supra. See also Elkinton, The Dying Patient, the Doctor and the

Law, 13 VILL. L. Rav. 740, 745 (1968); Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112
(1964).
78. Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School, A Definition of Irreversible Cona,
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to these four characteristics, the patient is hopelessly damaged, the doctor
should declare death and turn off any life-supporting systems. 79 When permanent brain damage and irreversible coma have occurred, the patient is
dead regardless of whether the heart is still beating. This proposed definition
more adequately conforms to medical realities than does the legal definition.
It is responsive to modern techniques that are able to restore "life" (according to the old definition based upon a heartbeat) and keep a person alive
by artificial means even when his central nervous system is permanently
destroyed.80 If this proposed definition of death were to be accepted on such
a wide scale that the legal profession were bound to accept it,81 the effect of
the proposed statute would be partially accomplished. However, the new
definition alone would not be helpful where patients without permanent
and total brain damage, but nonetheless beyond hope of recovery, survive
82
only through artificial means, such as a person on an artificial kidney.
Another method of preempting the need for a statute would be through
a judicial extension of the post mortem arrangements of a dying person.
In addition to property disposition, the current law allows one to make
burial provisions8 3 and to authorize organ transplants. 8 4 If one may make
these arrangements, should he not also be able to make arrangements regarding the nature of his death by giving directions to his doctor?
Each of these five approaches, whether based on constitutional interpretation, medical definitions, or legal analysis, would allow some circumventing
of the present law. A common objection is that each requires a gradual, yet
substantial, modification of the law that will occur only on a case-by-case
basis. Before a doctor acts he needs concrete assurance as to the legality of
his action. However, none of these approaches provides the clear assurance
afforded by the proposed statute.
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

The author of the statutory proposal reports few unfavorable responses
among the hundreds he has received. s The majority of responses are from
those most likely to be immediately concerned - the aged. One elderly woman

205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968). These criteria would apply to all patients except those with an overdose of sedatives; in those instances a flat EEG is not necessarily indicative of brain death.
79. Id. at 338.
80. Halley & Harvey, Medical v. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 JA.M.A. 423, 425
(1968). See also Editorial, 204 J.A.M.A. 539 (1968). For the purpose of organ transplants
an international symposium has recently adopted the definition of brain death. St.
Petersburg Times, July 20, 1969, §A at 13, col. 1.
81. The law treats death as a factual question to be determined by doctors. Ad Hoc
Committee, supra note 78, at 339.
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
83. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950).
84. FLA. STAT. §§736.24-.28 (1969). The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act does not define
death, but merely states that one's organs may not be transplanted until a doctor has
determined the time of death.
85. St. Petersburg Independent, Jan. 24, 1969, §A at 7, col. 1.
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in good health wrote: "How much more joyous the next twenty years would
be if I could at this time have a private, sensible arrangement with my
doctor to let me die in peace and dignity instead of squandering my estate
keeping alive a nothing."86 Another woman, eighty years of age, wrote of
her illness and then criticized her doctor: "[D]o I need to tell you life isn't
much fun anymore? Yet when I said to my doctor (while in my right mind)
that if I lost my mind or speech I wanted him to let me die with dignity to refrain from doing anything to prolong my life, he acted as though he
thought that was a ridiculous request."'8 7 Public opinion polls on related
subjects tend to support the conclusion of a generally favorable response.
Studies show that more than ninety per cent of the population wish to die
quickly and avoid suffering.8
Religious opinion seemingly favors the proposed statute. In a 1957 address Pope Pius XII declared that at the close of life physicians at the request
of relatives might abandon all efforts to delay death in order to permit the
patient, already virtually dead, to pass on in peace. 89 He also indicated that
it was the function of the physician, not the Church, to determine when
death had occurred. Pope Pius further declared that the moral obligation,
which relatives owed to dying kin, extended only to ordinary or conventional,
as contrasted with extraordinary, medical treatment:90
[I]f artificial respiration or other advanced techniques in seemingly
hopeless cases represent for the family such a burden as one could
not in conscience impose upon them, they may lawfully ask the doctor
to end his efforts and the doctor may lawfully comply.
He concluded that since artificial respiration and other advanced techniques
go beyond generally accepted standards, it is not obligatory to use them in
seemingly hopeless cases. 91 Earlier the Pope had declared that one who is
dying may use drugs to deaden the pain even if death is hastened.9 2 Similarly,
the attitude of Jewish leaders is that any factor that artificially delays the
patient's final demise may be withdrawn. 93 Although a major Florida newspaper supported the proposal editorially, 94 there was a lack of more general
support from those in a position to influence public opinion. This was ap-

St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 24, 1969, §B at 6, col. 2.
St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 9, 1969, §B at 1, col. 1.
88. J. HINTON, DYINc 23 (1929). See also G. "VILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 290 (1958). But cf., N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW 266 (1961).
89. New York Times, Nov. 25, 1957, §1 at 1, col. 3.
90. Id.
91. Id. In discussing the death with dignity proposal a Catholic priest commented:
"Living man has the right to life; dying man has the right to death." Orlando Sentinel,
Feb. 20, 1969, §D at 6, col.5.
92. New York Times, Feb. 19, 1957, §1 at 1, col. 5.
86.
87.

93.
(1967).

94.

Whitlow

& Rosner,

Extreme Measures To Prolong Life, 202 J.A.M.A.

374, 376

St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 24, 1969, §D at 2, col. 1.
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parently due to a confusion with euthanasia, which prevented the prior
constitutional proposal from reaching the floor of the Florida House in
1969.15
DEATH WITH DIGNITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

No American jurisdiction has adopted anything resembling the death
with dignity proposal. While no other country has legalized voluntary
euthanasia, some have made modifications of criminal liability, which are
relevant to a discussion of death with dignity. For example, German law
does not regard as homicide the "physician's failure to prolong artificially
an expiring painful life by applying stimulants." 96 Switzerland permits a
physician to make poison available to a fatally ill patient provided the
doctor does not administer it himself. 9 Under the modem continental codes
motive may be a mitigating element in the over-all guilt determination. 9s
Several countries have introduced into their codes the separate crime of
"homicide upon request," which carries a more lenient punishment than
ordinary homicide.99 Only in Uruguay does a compassionate homicide, performed on request of the victim, escape all punishment. 100 Sweden, and
probably other code countries, allow "passive euthanasia" - that is, the withdrawal of life.supporting therapy to allow a hopeless patient to die in peace.O1'
PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL

If the present proposal were enacted, the major result would be to grant
doctors the legal assurance to permit an incurably ill patient to expire naturally. Criminal liability would be removed for acts performed pursuant to
statutory safeguards requiring authorization by the next of kin. Second, many
insurance policies make an exception when death is caused by an intentional,
not accidental, taking of one's own life. 10 2 Whether the courts would find
that one who requested his doctor to let him die naturally, instead of keeping
95. St. Petersburg Times, July 3, 1969, §B at 2, col. 2. Aside from the inability to distinguish euthanasia from death with dignity, this attitude ignores the fact that many
doctors admit to practicing "euthanasia" in the case of incurable adult sufferers. See
Levisohn, Voluntary Mercy Deaths, 8 J. FOR. MEDICINE 57, 68 (1961).
96. Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
350, 359 (1954), citing, ScHoENKE, STRAFGESETZBUCH, KOAMMENTAR 565 (6th rev. ed. 1952).
97. SCmVmZERSCHES STRAFGESMrzBUCH 111-15 (1942), cited in, G. WILLIAMS, supra note
88, at 271, 297.
98. Silving, supra note 96, at 363.
99. Id. at 378. The additional element is that the victim was a fatally ill person who
had specifically requested the accused to act.
100. PENAL CODE OF URUGUAY, art. 37 (1939), cited in, Silving, supra note 96, at 369.
101. Bi6rck, On the Definition of Death, 14 WORLD MEDICAL J. 137 (1967). With relatives' permission, a doctor disconnected the infusion drip of a hopelessly ill patient. The
doctors were found not guilty, as the Swedish court concluded that no medical or human
purpose would have been fulfilled by continuing the treatment, cited in, Bi6rck, When Is
Death?, 1968 WIs. L. REv. 484, 488 (1968).
102. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1957).
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him alive artificially, legally committed suicide is an open question. Hopefully, enabling legislation would be enacted to prevent the loss of insurance
proceeds or workmen's compensation benefits.10a
Potentially, the most important change, but the one most difficult to
evaluate, would be the attitudes of the aged. As letters and opinion polls
indicate,104 the vast majority of people wish to die peacefully. 1° ', They view
death not as an evil that must be resisted but as an inevitable end that
comes to all men.1 00 However, the nature of medical education causes doctors
to oppose death., °7 Many doctors have a tendency to go "all out" to keep a
patient alive regardless of the quality of the life.10s In contrast, many nurses,
who do not have ultimate responsibility, react towards hopeless patients by
asking: "Why not let him die, instead of prolonging his life so he may suffer
more?"110 9 The new statute would give dying patients the foreknowledge and
assurance that they need not continue to live in the twilight zone between
life and death when all hope is gone, but that they could, if they so desired,
come to a natural and peaceful end.
CONCLUSION

One doctor has noted: "There are too many instances . . . in which patients . . . are kept alive indefinitely by means of tubes inserted into their

stomachs, or into their veins, or into their bladders, or into their rectums and the whole sad scene thus created is encompassed within a cocoon of
oxygen which is the next thing to a shroud." 11 Since, of all the ages of man,
death, involving only man and his Maker, is perhaps the most personal, it
seems only reasonable to give man some voice in the manner of his death.
While one individual may wish to be kept alive indefinitely with the aid
of every technique at modern medicine's disposal, another may prefer to

103. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949); FLA. STAT. §440.09 (3)
(1967).
104. See notes 85-88 supra.
105. When patients are beyond hope of recovery they frequently beg and plead to be
allowed to die. B. GLASER & M. STRAUSS, AWARENESS OF DYING 217 (1965). Those who are
mentally alert occasionally try to trick nurses into increasing their drug dosage to hasten
death. Id. at 211-12.
106. Wassermann, Problematical Aspects of the Phenomenon of Death, 14 WORLD
MEDICAL J. 146 (1967). The deaths of Julius Caesar and Socrates are examples of this
approach: "It seems to me most strange that men should fear, [s]eeing that death, a
necessary end, [w]ill come when it will come." SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, II, ii, 35-37.
"I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should
only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit ...
A man should die in peace." PLATO, PHAEDO, l16a-118d.
107. Wasserman, note 106 supra.
108. B. GLASER & M STRAUss, supra note 105, at 185-86, 190, 192. For an almost bitter
account of the manner in which the doctors kept her husband alive, see Anonymous, A
Way of Dying, 199 ATLANTIC, Jan. 1957, at 53.
109. B. GLASER 9. M. STRAUSS, supra note 105, at 192, 217.
110. ld.at 201.
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have life cease peacefully when death is certain. The former is assured of
having his wish carried out, the latter is not.
While society does have an interest in the artificial prolongation of life,"1
most of the disadvantages fall on the patient and his relatives. Although there
is the ever-present possibility of abuse,1 ' 2 it could be greatly reduced through
proper procedures and safeguards. The law cannot lead science and medicine, 3 but here a consensus of medicine, theology, and public opinion has
been reached and the law is lagging behind. Although there are several
ways that the law might deal with the problem,"- the most comprehensive
and reassuring method of closing this gap would be to grant each citizen
the right to be permitted to die with dignity. Recognizing that man wishes
a voice in the quality of his life and the nature of his death, government
should step back from the area and allow those who wish to avail themselves
of the statute to die according to their own standards of dignity and peace.
HOWARD W. BRILL

111. Potter, The ParadoxicalPreservation of a Principle, 13 VILL. L. REV. 784 (1968).
112. See generally Kamisar, Some Non-religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. Rxv. 969, 975-99 (1958).
113. Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS, INTERNAL MEDICINE (Supp. 7,
at 15 (1967)). See also The New Biology and the Law (remarks of Judge Warren E.
Burger), 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 432 (1969).
114. In addition to those discussed in text accompanying notes 43-84 supra, see Potter,
note 111 supra.
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